On August 21, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Venezuela General License 61 and General License 62, together with FAQ 1266, authorizing telecommunications-related transactions that the Venezuela sanctions program would otherwise block. GL 61 opens the supply of certain items and services to Venezuela for telecommunications; GL 62 goes further, permitting the negotiation and entry into contingent contracts for investment in Venezuela's telecommunications sector. For sanctions and trade-compliance teams, the move expands the set of permissible Venezuela telecom operations and signals a deliberate US policy posture toward Venezuelan telecom engagement.
Both licenses are permissive, not mandatory: they carve transactions out of the prohibitions of 31 CFR Chapter V rather than impose new obligations. There is no entry-into-force deadline to track. General licenses take effect on issuance (here, August 21, 2026), and the authorization applies the moment a transaction meets the license's terms. The work for compliance teams is therefore to read the license text precisely and confirm each planned activity falls inside it, not to race a calendar.
What do General License 61 and General License 62 authorize?
GL 61 authorizes the supply of certain items and services to Venezuela related to telecommunications. The license text enumerates the eligible categories; activities outside those categories remain prohibited absent another authorization. GL 62 authorizes negotiations of, and entry into, contingent contracts for investment in the telecommunications sector of Venezuela. The word "contingent" is doing real work here: the contracts become effective only if and when a future authorization or change in sanctions posture permits performance, so teams can structure deals now without breaching the prohibitions on execution.
| License | Scope | Key condition |
|---|---|---|
| GL 61 | Supply of certain telecommunications-related items and services to Venezuela | Items and services must fall within the license's enumerated categories |
| GL 62 | Negotiating and entering contingent investment contracts in Venezuela's telecom sector | Contracts are contingent on a future authorization or sanctions change before performance |
OFAC issued FAQ 1266 alongside the two licenses to explain their scope and how they interact with the existing Venezuela sanctions framework. Reading the FAQ together with the license text is the fastest way to map what is now permitted against your portfolio of Venezuela exposure.
Who is impacted, and what is the compliance task?
The exposed audience is specific: sanctions and trade-compliance officers at US companies and financial institutions handling Venezuela-related payments or exposure, and telecom-sector legal and investment teams evaluating permissible cross-border operations or contingent investment contracts. Because OFAC jurisdiction reaches any transaction touching the US financial system or a US person, non-US firms routing Venezuela telecom business through USD clearing are inside scope too.
The compliance task is permissive review, not penalty avoidance. Teams should map current and pipeline Venezuela telecom activities against GL 61's enumerated categories; assess whether GL 62 lets investment desks lawfully structure contingent contracts now; and update internal Venezuela sanctions procedures and screening logic to reflect the newly authorized carve-outs. The risk is a missed opportunity, proceeding without confirming the authorization or needlessly blocking a now-permitted transaction, not a new prohibition.
How does this interact with the 50 Percent Rule and strict liability?
The licenses do not suspend OFAC's baseline rules. The 50 Percent Rule still applies: any entity 50 percent or more owned in the aggregate by blocked persons is itself blocked even if not separately named on the SDN List, so counterparties must still be screened against the SDN and consolidated sanctions lists before relying on a general license. A general license authorizes the transaction type; it does not vet your counterparty.
OFAC sanctions operate on strict liability, meaning civil penalties can attach without intent, though voluntary self-disclosure materially mitigates exposure (up to 50 percent under 31 CFR Part 501, Appendix A). Documenting that a transaction was structured within GL 61 or GL 62, with current counterparty screening, is the defensible record. This issuance is also distinct from the August 18, 2026 OFAC action on the International Criminal Court and a separate Venezuela designation with General License 12: different instruments, different dates, different subject matter, handled under the same Venezuela program file.
Take advantage of this real-time watch
Obsidian's continuous, per-jurisdiction real-time monitoring surfaces this kind of change the moment it publishes, so your team can map new authorizations against live Venezuela exposure the same day. Concrete next steps:
- Confirm whether current or pipeline Venezuela telecom activities fall within GL 61's enumerated item and service categories.
- Assess whether GL 62 lets investment desks lawfully structure contingent contracts now, contingent on a future authorization.
- Re-screen all Venezuela counterparties under the 50 Percent Rule against the current SDN and consolidated sanctions lists.
- Update internal Venezuela sanctions procedures and screening logic to reflect the newly authorized carve-outs, and brief telecom, trade-finance, and investment teams on what is now permissible versus still prohibited.
